Lessons abundant, but no one willing to learn


10 killed, including 6 Pakistanis, on Ethiopia farm owned by Saudi tycoon

Gambella rebels repulse government army attack, says GDM

Another example of Meles’s ill thought policies. The thought process goes like this …

Problem: Need to increase government revenues and earn foreign currency.

Solution: lets privatize land [to foreigners who will not someday become economically powerful and vie for political power], increase output, increase exports, generate tax revenues and foreign currency.

Process: clear the locals who now live on the land, suppress dissent, tell the world its for their own good or that they are anti-peace.

The result is conflict and misery for locals and a failed policy. Just look at what happened on Al Amoudi’s farm in Gambella.  The government will probably take this as a call for further militarization rather than taking a step back and evaluating whether there were problems with the policy in the first place. The resistance is a sign that  local interests aren’t being considered, and not, as EPRDF likes to argue, that people are anti-peace or terror-loving or anti-development.  The Ogaden experience should have been a lesson.  People felt disenfranchised, some took action against oil workers, the result was war, displacement, misery for locals but it also stopped the explration. No body wins.


Transferring public assets to friends


Ethiopia sells off seven state firms

Meles and friends are continuing the transfer tradition of public assets to private hands that they started long ago. In the latest bout of auctions 5 of 7 firms went to their good friend Al-Amoudi – the same person that has previously received many other public assets including a gold mine.

Of course if the Ethiopian people had any say over their governance, this privatization process would not only be transparent but it would also need to provide some evidence that privatization is in the interest of the current owners – THE PUBLIC! Unfortunately, Meles and friends operate as if what is “government owned” is owned by them personally.  They thus see public engagement as an unnecessary exercise. The government is thus trading a one time cash infusion for its ownership stake without any public discussion.  What is more, much of these assets are going to those connected to the regime!

Shouldn’t the goals of privatizing be open to discussion?  Doesn’t the public need to know the basis for the decision to privatize some firms but not others? Shouldn’t the bidding process and the terms of what is expected of the  new company be open to public scrutiny?

I have no problems with privatizing as long as there are objective and convincing reason for doing it and the process can be kept transparent, but  I don’t think it should just be blindly embraced. Where are the studies that have looked at the benefits and costs of privatizing?   How is it that firm after firm goes to the same joe? Of course there isn’t going to be an answer from this regime on any of these questions.

አደግን ተመነደግን (Satire)

እውቀት የዘለቀው መሪ ስለሰጠን
በጣም ይገባናል ፈጣሪን ማመስገን
አይገኝም ከቶ እንደ ኣያ መለስ
እንኩዋንስ በአፍሪቃ - አለም ቢታሰስ ...
	ደግሞም ከእውቀት በላይ ወሬ ሲያውቁበት
	ተናግረው አይጠግቡም ፣ ስለ ህገር እድገት
		“አደግን ተመነደግን ለሰማይ ቀርበናል
		'ኢሊትም' ተብለናል ፣ አለም ቀንቶብናል!
		አምልጠንም ወጥተን ከተረጂነት
		ባህላችን ነውና ሲራቡ ማብላት
		እንደ ሳኡዲ ላሉ ለተቸገሩት
		ለመስጠት ደርሰናል ማደሪያ መሬት፡፡
		ደስ ይበልህ ህዝቤ!!!
		በተቀረው መሬት …
		ለደስታ መግለጫ አበባ ዘርተናል
		በዚህ ጥጋብ ዘመን እህል ምን ያደርጋል?”
ሃብቱ እንደበዛለት ጎተራው እንደሞላ
ባሳሰቡት ቁጥር ያለበትን ተድላ
እያብሰለሰለ የጥጋቡን ኑሮ
ወገን ተሰቃይቶአል ቁንጣን ተወጥሮ፡፡
	በልቻለሁ ካሉት ሆድ ባይርበውማ
	ሃገር አድግዋል ሲሉ ቢበለፅግማ
	ልቦለድ እንደ እህል ደግፎ ቢያኖር
	ይሄ ተረት ተረት ባልከፋ ነበር፡፡

ልሳን (2002 እ.ኢ.አ)

Ethiopia: Diaspora Policy Document


There is a new Diaspora Policy document that the Ethiopian government is circulating. In my opinion, the most important thing for this (or any other) Ethiopian government to do on this issue is to allow Ethiopians to retain their citizenship by opening the door for dual citizenship (constitutionally). This creates the necessary incentives for Ethiopians to remain engaged in events in their home country and to retain their Ethiopian identity even generations later.

Currently, the government has adopted another strategy (the Yellow card) to give certain rights to people of Ethiopian origin. I think there are serious problems with that path. To start, it essentially makes people report that they have adopted another citizenship in exchange for those rights. There is however no guarantee that these rights will not change or be taken away in the future. If the government decides to reduce or eliminate these rights at some future time, there will be no recourse to the individuals who have declared their new citizenship. This is a very big uncertainty.

Second, there is a large number of Ethiopians born to parents in Europe, the United States and elsewhere. Giving them rights of Ethiopian citizenship ensures their continued engagement in events in their country (and not just them, but their children as well).  The bulk of this involvement is likely to be economic, technological and knowledge transfer, and the benefits are likely to be very large.

There is really no reason to not allow dual citizenship. It is a much less complicated course to take. It encourages the participation of Ethiopians in their country and the potential benefits (both to the individuals and the country) are very large.

Drone Base in Ethiopia and Ethiopia-U.S. relations


A few days ago the Washington Post reported that the U.S. now has a drone base in Arba Minch, Ethiopia. This development is at odds with the position the Ethiopian government was taking just a few years ago. As many recall, in 2007 and 2008 the Ethiopian government was reversing its policy of allowing bases in the country. Previously at least two locations, Bilate and Hurso, hosted members of the U.S. military. One embassy cable released by Wikileaks had Samora Yunus, the head of the Ethiopian military, saying “just as Ethiopians cannot occupy a camp within a U.S. base, the U.S. should not expect to have a camp within an Ethiopian base.”

As it turns out, despite Samora’s statement, the government was not making its case on ideological grounds. It was rather jockeying for position as its relations with the U.S. became increasingly strained due to its own repressive actions internally and the lobbying efforts of Ethiopians in the U.S. which led the U.S. House to consider HR-2003. The Ethiopian government also expected relations with the U.S. to worsen thinking that human rights and democracy would trump counterterrorism in U.S. foreign policy once Obama takes office. Several cables discuss the nervousness the Meles circle felt about the new U.S. administration (example here). In 2009, after Obama took office, Meles continued to complain about U.S. policies toward Ethiopia. The EPRDF leadership was signaling that a worsening of relations would not be consequence free for U.S. interests.

Thankfully for Meles, the Obama administration proved to be much more hawkish than anticipated.  Meles’s strategy seems to also have payed off by blunting U.S. criticism on human rights, killing HR-2003, while his government continued the very same repressive internal policies. The opening of this drone facility signals that the U.S. and Ethiopian governments have settled on a new arrangement in line with what the Ethiopian government wanted.

Interestingly, one of the cables from Wikileaks was dismissive of the Ethiopian government’s concerns of shifting U.S. policy. It said that these concerns arose because members of the Meles government (members of the TPLF central committee) “do not fully understand American issues or the world around them.”  Of course it wasn’t just TPLF insiders that assumed the new administration would give human rights and good governance a priority. Many Ethiopians in the U.S. who lobbied the U.S. government and worked hard for the election of the current president shared the same sentiment. Apparently, the hard liners in the TPLF trust the American system to reflect the wishes of those who elect it than do U.S. diplomats. Of course, what is even more disappointing is that the diplomats were right.

United States Policy Towards Africa – Atlantic Council


Interesting conversation at the Atlantic Council with five former Assistant Secretaries for African Affairs. They discuss their experiences spanning the period from 1981 to 2009 covering the most important issues during their tenure. At times the conversation shows how ad-hoc and arbitrary policy making is but also highlights its biggest achievements. The entire transcript is here.

Herman Cohen, whom many Ethiopians blame for Eritrea’s eventual succession from Ethiopia, described how he alone made the decision to recognize Eritrean rights to Self Determination. At the time, the decision went contrary to what was established U.S. policy. He says the following on events that took place during the London conference in 1991:

we reached a final stage of peace agreement in Ethiopia where the – Mengistu had already pulled out, and we had the TPLF and EPLF ready to take power. So the question was how do we bring it to a soft landing without destroying Addis Ababa and that sort of thing?

And I – so Meles Zenawi and Isaias said to me, you should announce the agreement because that’ll have credibility. So this was in London and was – must have been a slow news day because every television camera in the world was there. And so I announced what the agreement was and then the question period, they – which was that Eritrea would have an referendum within three years and – to decide whether they wanted to be independent. And so I announced that, and then in the question period, they said, well, Mr. Secretary, your policy has always been very consistent: Do not allow African countries to split up – is consistent with the OAU policy, and here you are now condoning the splitting up of Ethiopia. So I said, well, you know, this is a special case. Eritrea never had – the people of Eritrea never had the right of self-determination, back – going back to the Second World War and previous. They were always forced into things. So now we approve of this. Well, OK, fine; I gave the answer.

I go back to the embassy, and five hours later Washington wakes up. (Laughter.) And they said, Secretary Cohen, the secretary of state wants to talk to you. I said, oh, my God. So I – so he calls me and he said, I see in the press this morning that you made this statement of we approve of Eritrea self-determination; did you really say that? I said, yes, Mr. Secretary. He says, well, we’re in trouble now. So, you know, I made statements without clearing it first. (Laughter.) And he – and I said, what’s the matter? He said, well, we’re fighting the Germans now about self-determination for Slovenia and Croatia – And if we say – and we’re against it! We want them to stay in Yugoslavia, and here you are splitting up Ethiopia; the press is going on us like crazy. So then he said, next time you do that, check with me first. (Makes slamming noise.) I said, my career is finished. But a week went by and nothing happened; the press didn’t get onto it, you see. So I met him [Baker] in Lisbon to sign the Angola peace treaty. He was all smiles and everything was fine.

Whether one agrees with Cohen’s decision, the amount of power that individuals can hold in regards to Africa with so limited consequence is enraging, to say the least. His position no doubt facilitated the process of Eritrea’s independence in a manner that met all the wishes of EPLF and TPLF. Though both forces had won the war, they had no mandate to make these decisions at the time. The consequence for Cohen, as he later jokes, is that he gets lectures from Ethiopian cab drivers in D.C.

Of more recent developments, Jendayi Frazer, after highlighting the successes of her tenure, said the following on Somalia:

most unfortunate, from my perspective, was of course the Horn of Africa. I went in as assistant secretary determined not to do Somalia. I absolutely had no desire to deal with Somalia at all. I didn’t see that there was any solution there. I did not think it was right for any type of, you know, conflict-resolution approach, nation-building, state-building – whatever you want to call it, I didn’t think Somalia was right for it.

Because of another agency that will go unnamed and their activities, we ended up being right in the middle of Somalia, and the decision was made that we needed to internationalize our engagement in Somalia. Essentially that other agency was narrowly focused on counterterrorism and got in the middle of the unwieldy dynamics of clan, ascendancy, and warlordism, et cetera. And so we wanted to internationalize.
So we established a Somali contact group. I think the idea there was to internationalize it and then pull out, right? And leave it to others, the Nordics and others, the Italians and now the British and others. But we were – they were smart enough to not allow us to get out – (laughter) – and so we stayed stuck. And unfortunately, you know, not to say anything disparaging about the, you know, the importance of the lives of the Somali people, because we had a very robust humanitarian response to Somalia, but from a conflict resolution perspective, then as is, you know, now, we really had to work hard to try to bring some type of, you know, peace process to the fore and obviously it’s not a success, even to this day.

But Frazer was mum on how to get out of these problems.

Interesting conversation also on Darfur and the decision to label what was going on as genocide.

Very open discussions over all and a must read for those interested in U.S. policy on Africa.

USG diplomatic priorities: Ethiopia and Eritrea – A cursory look


Ethiopia and Eritrea have very different relationships with the United States government. The Ethiopian government is a valued ally while relations with Eritrea have been adversarial for the last decade. One would therefore expect somewhat different priorities between the concerns of US diplomats in the two countries. Looking at the tags that describe each cable available through Wikileaks, however, the diplomats concerns in the two countries appear quite similar (see below for details). It is especially interesting how Human Rights concerns rank 3rd in importance among the cables from both capitals. The narrative that emphasizes Human Rights in U.S. foreign policy is put in doubt when its relationship with these two governments is so different despite the similar focus on Human Rights concerns by U.S. diplomats in both places.

The following is a summary of all the tags from the Addis Ababa and Asmara cables available through Wikileaks. Each cable has a tag that indicates the country of origin as well as tags that indicate the subject matter of the cable (e.g. PGOV for Internal Government Affairs, PHUM for Human Rights). Tag frequencies provide a glimpse of the priorities of the diplomats in the two capitals. The percentages below exclude country codes for the origin country and only the top 5 are shown below.

Addis Ababa cables (6054 tags excluding country code)
PREL  External Political Relations  14.8%
PGOV  Internal Governmental Affairs 11.6%
PHUM  Human Rights                   6.2%
SO    Somalia                        4.8%
MOPS  Military Operations            4.6%
Asmara cables(2100 tags excluding country code)
TAG KEY Percent total
PGOV	Internal Governmental Affairs	17.4%
PREL	External Political Relations	15.2%
PHUM	Human Rights	        5.7%
ASEC	Security	        4.9%
ECON	Economic Conditions	4.6%

For expanded definitions of the tags, see here. Definitions for the top 3 are below.

PGOV: The form, structure, and organization of local, provincial, and national governments.

PREL: The political relations between countries, international or regional organizations both bilateral and multilateral, that assess intentions, objectives, plans, or possible courses of interaction.

PHUM: The violation of rights attributable to human beings.